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We empirically examine the distribution of bargaining power between buyers and sellers 
on the biotechnology markets by estimating the extracted surplus in alliance agreements, 
which depends on each party’s bargaining power. The results show that buyers have 
extracted more surplus than sellers. However, these also reveal that the surplus extracted 
by buyers has been decreasing while that of the sellers has been increasing. We construe 
that the prices of biotechnologies have been lower than their market value because of 
the strong bargaining position of buyers, but that sellers’ negotiating power may been 
improving. 
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1. Introduction 
     The division of innovative labor between biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies 
has become essential in drug research since the first successful biotechnology products reached 
the market in the early 1990s.
1 The advancement of biotechnology by universities and public 
research institutes (PRIs) has significantly contributed to the improved productivity of 
pharmaceutical R&D in the United States (Cockburn and Henderson, 2001). Dedicated 
biotechnology companies, generally spin-offs from universities and PRIs, play an important role 
in this technology transfer process. Europe (Fuchs, 2003) and Japan (Motohashi, 2007) also 
exhibit changes in the pharmaceutical innovation process from in-house R&D to an open model. 
A well-functioning market for knowledge assets, where biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies trade technologies in various types of alliance agreements, is now indispensable for 
the effective R&D management of pharmaceutical companies.   
     Alliances between biotech and pharmaceutical companies take various forms, including 
collaborative research, licensing, equity investment, and joint ventures. Baker et al. (2008) 
compare the governance mechanism of various types of alliances, using a model that takes into 
account both externality associated with collaboration and ex-post contracting problems and 
ex-ante ones in the conventional model (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 
1994). They show that all types of alliances do not lead to the first-best solution by the merger 
of the two parties and that an optimal type of alliance is determined by various parameters and 
payoff functions. A substantial number of empirical studies analyze the innovative impacts of 
strategic alliances. Product development of a pharmaceutical company benefits from an alliance 
with biotech start-ups, particularly when the former has complementary assets (Rothaermel, 
2001). Anand and Khanna (2000) reveal the effects on stock market valuations of strategic 
alliances. However, empirical studies that investigate bargaining alliance contracts are quite 
rare. 
     This paper examines the workings of the knowledge market in the biopharmaceutical 
industry by empirically analyzing the distribution of bargaining power among sellers and buyers 2 
 
of knowledge assets. With regard to biotechnologies, both groups can possess considerable 
bargaining power in an alliance contract, and the unbalanced negotiation outcome between the 
two sides can negatively affect research performance and thus pharmaceutical innovation. 
     The possession of strong patent rights among sellers, many of which are biotechnology 
companies, can lead to considerable bargaining clout. Pro-patent policy reforms, such as the 
establishment of CAFCs and the Bayh Dole Act of 1980, have contributed to the propagation of 
biotech spin-off firms in the United States (Cockburn et. al, 1999). It should be noted that too 
strong patent rights may cause the “anti-commons” problem (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). If the 
price of research input is too high, many pharmaceutical companies may be discouraged to use 
them, resulting in the delay of new drugs. The buyers, often pharmaceutical companies, can gain 
in negotiating power through financial constraints on biotechnology firms (Lerner et al., 2003). 
Biotechnology products usually require many years of R&D and large investments of capital. 
Moreover, because of considerable information asymmetries in biotechnology research, it is 
often difficult for investors to assess its progress. Many research-intensive biotechnology 
companies have financed themselves through both public equity issues and alliances with 
pharmaceutical companies. However, given the characteristics of biotechnology research, the 
amount of capital raised from the public market has been highly variable.
2 Thus, when a 
biotechnology firm has difficulty in financing a R&D project, pharmaceutical corporations can 
have large bargaining power as investors. This could cause inefficiency if the latter gained a 
large part of the control rights in the research project.
3 
     We analyze the bargaining outcome in the formation of biotechnology alliances by 
applying the empirical framework proposed by Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2009a). Although 
their econometric method does not identify the bargaining power of the respective parties, it 
does estimate the surplus, which depends on the former, extracted by each in individual 
alliances. Thus, the approach of Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2009a) is useful in examining the 
distributions of bargaining power among the buyers and sellers of biotechnologies. Using their 
empirical framework, we found that buyers tend to extract more surplus than sellers. The results 3 
 
imply that the contract prices of biotechnologies have been lower than their market value 
because of the stronger bargaining positions of pharmaceutical firms. However, the findings, 
after controlling for those firm features that affect bargaining power, also show that the 
extracted surplus of buyers has been decreasing, and that of sellers slightly increasing. It appears, 
therefore, that the bargaining positions of sellers may be improving and that contract prices may 
be approaching the market values of biotechnologies. 
     The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains its empirical framework. 
Section 3 describes the sample data. Section 4 presents the estimation results. The final section 
discusses the results and offers a conclusion.   
 
2. Empirical framework 
          Both the seller and the buyer extract surplus from an alliance agreement, but the division 
of the surplus between them depends on their respective bargaining power. As already indicated, 
we apply the empirical framework of Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2009a), which is explained 
below, to examine the effect of bargaining on alliance agreements.
4 
    Let the contract price of an alliance agreement, a seller’s reservation price, and a buyer’s 
maximum offer be  p , p , and  p , respectively Then, the contract price can be decomposed as 
follows: 
  p p p p     ,                              ( 1 )  
where  1 0     is the bargaining power of the seller. 
     N e x t ,  l e t      x v E x |    denote the expected market value of technologies traded in an 
alliance agreement, conditional on technology characteristics and alliance types, where v is the 
unobservable value of traded technologies and x is a vector of that characteristics of the 
technologies and alliance types. We assume that the value of technologies depends on their 
types, based on interviews with industry experts from several pharmaceutical companies. The 
interviewees acknowledged that different types of technologies are traded at diverse contract 4 
 
prices and also that the important technologies of pharmaceutical companies have been 
changing over years. By assuming that the contract price depends on alliance types, we examine 
the interview results in light of the findings of Baker and others (2008). They reveal that the 
spillover (or externality) from a joint project onto the parent companies is an important factor in 
determining the form of strategic alliances in biotechnologies. Therefore, the contract price can 
be different across diverse alliance types. 
     By  construction,   p x p    . Then, equation (1) is rewritten as 
           p x x p x p            1 .                    ( 2 )  
The terms     0   x p   and     0   p x   in equation (2) are a buyer and a seller’s 
expected surplus from the transaction, respectively. In equation (2), the difference between the 
actual contract price and   x   is determined by each party’s bargaining power and the 
expected surplus. The seller can increase the price by extracting the buyer’s surplus    x p   , 
depending on the bargaining power   . Similarly, the buyer can decrease the price by extracting 
the seller’s surplus     p x  
,
 depending on the bargaining power     1 . Although   
cannot be identified, the surplus extracted by the seller and buyer,     x p     and 
     p x     1 , can be interpreted as the result of each party’s bargaining on the contract price. 
     In equation (2), the outcome variable p has the lower boundary        p x x       1 
and the upper boundary      x p x      . Then, equation (2) can be rewritten as the 
regression equation in the format of a two-tier stochastic frontier model: 
v u w x p       .                             ( 3 )  
The regression part of equation (3),  x , corresponds to the market value of traded technologies, 
 x  , where     is a vector of parameters for the covariates  x. In the residual part of equation 
(3),  v u w     , w corresponds to the buyer’s surplus extracted by the seller,     x p    , 5 
 
and u corresponds to the seller’s surplus extracted by buyer,        p x     1 , where both w 
and u are nonnegative. Finally,  v   is the classical error term. 
     To estimate the parameter set    w u v      , , ,  , it is assumed that (i) w follows an 
exponential distribution with the mean  w  , (ii) u follows an exponential distribution with the 
mean  u  , (iii) v follows a normal distribution with zero mean and variance 
2
v  , and (iv) the 
error components are distributed independently of each other and from the covariates x. Based 
on these distributional assumptions, the pdf of the i-th residual,  i  ,    i f  , is driven as 































































   ( is the 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal variable). Kumbhakar and Parmeter 
(2009a) explain the derivation of the pdf (4).
5 Then, the estimates of the parameter set 
 w u v      , , ,    can be obtained by the maximum likelihood method based on (4). Since the 
parameters  u   and  v    appear in distinct parts of the log likelihood equation, the 
identification of the two parameters is achievable. 
     Having estimated the coefficients of equation (3), we calculate the observation-specific 
expectation of w and u conditional on the total residual ,     | w E  and   | u E , which are 
driven by Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2009a). As explained in section 2, they are estimates of the 
extracted surplus by a seller and buyer in an alliance agreement. Since the dependent variable is 
in log form,    | w E  and    | u E  approximate the rates of increase and decrease of the 
contract price as a result of the bargaining between the seller and buyer. Then, we further 
examine the relationship between the extracted surplus,     | w E  and    | u E , which are 
proxy variables of the seller and buyer’s bargaining power and of the various exogenous factors 
that are possibly related to each party’s bargaining power but not directly related to the 6 
 
characteristics of the traded technologies and alliance types (the controls of the two-tier 
stochastic frontier model). This examination is done by regressing     | w E  and    | u E  on 
the exogenous variables.
6 
   For the exogenous variables, we choose several characteristics of each party, which are 
explained in detail in the following section, and the year dummies as the variables of 
macro-economy factors. In using year dummies as the macro-economy factors, we assume that 
annual changes in governmental policy and market condition affect each party’s bargaining 
power in the individual alliance contract, as explained in our introduction. We do not include 
year dummies in the estimation of the two-tier stochastic model, based on the conjecture that 
exogenous factors cause changes in the value of technologies more gradually, such as in periods 
of five to ten years. 
 
3. The data 
     All the data for the empirical analysis explained above is taken from RDNA database of 
Deloitte Recap, a company specializing in the biotechnology industry since 1988.
7 We 
downloaded 21,451 records of alliances formed from September 1973 to September 2008 from 
the RDNA database. However, since many alliances in the database lack data for some variables, 
only part of them are viable in an empirical analysis. To be specific, among the total 21,451 
alliance records that we downloaded, only 10,390 alliances contain data for the development 
stages of traded technologies. In the following, we first define the sample for estimating the 
two-tier stochastic frontier model and then define the sub-samples for the regression analysis of 
the extracted surplus by sellers and buyers. 
 
3.1 The variables and sample for the two-tier stochastic frontier model 
     For the contract price of alliance agreements, the dependent variable of equation (3), we 
use log of SIZE in RDNA, where SIZE is deflated by using US GDP deflator. A licensing 7 
 
agreement consists typically of payments, milestone payments, and royalty fees. The SIZE 
variable is the total amount of payments expressed in the licensing contract, not only in cash but 
also in equities. In this sense, the royalty payment (designated by a percentage of sales) is not 
taken into account here. In addition, milestone payments will be paid only when each specific 
condition is met. Therefore, the SIZE may underestimate the total expected value of the contract 
by missing the royalty, and overestimate it by adding all milestone payments. Therefore, we 
decided to use this value as the proxy of total value (price) of the licensing contract. Such biases 
do not exist for other type of alliances, such as research collaborations and joint ventures. 
Among the total 21,451 alliances, only 7,809 have the data for the SIZE. 
     For the technological characteristics of an alliance agreement, a part of the control 
variables of equation (3), we use types and development stages of traded technologies in this 
manner. RDNA classifies technology types into more than fifty. We grouped these into twelve. 
Appendix, Table 1 presents the correspondence between the RDNA technology types and the 
integrated twelve types. For the development stages, we use nine stages in RDNA: Discovery, 
Lead Molecule, Preclinical, Phase I, Phase II, Phase III, Approved, BLD/NDA filed, and 
Formulation. Several technologies can be traded in an alliance, which can possess several 
development stages. For the alliances with several technologies, we include all technology 
dummies but use only the latest stage dummy for the development stages. 
     For the characteristics of each alliance agreement, that is, the other part of control 
variables in equation (3), we employ five alliance types created out of the integration of the 
RDNA’s twenty-two alliance types. RDNA originally lists twenty-six, but we excluded the 
following four: Letter of Intent, Security, Settlement, and Termination, which are ancillary 
information to alliance types.
8 Appendix, Table 2 presents the correspondence between the 
RDNA’s original alliance types and our integrated variants. 
     The estimation of the two-tier stochastic frontier model is based on the sample of the 
alliances containing all the data of the above variables. The sample, however, excludes those 
with universities, since these may have been in different competitive positions than commercial 8 
 
organizations.
9 Moreover, only the alliances formed from January 1990 are used, for after that 
year did pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies develop relationships that 
commercialized biotechnology products (Audretsch, 2001). All the 21,451 alliance records 
include data for the year of the contract. The sample is confined to 2,980 alliances. Figure 1 
shows the number of alliances and the average SIZE in each year, and Table 1 summarizes the 
data for the technological traits and the alliance types. In both Figure 1 and Table 1, the sample 
is compared to all the data containing each variable. 
 
Figure 1 Number of alliances and the average SIZE 
Table 1 Summary of the sample data for the estimation of two-tier stochastic frontier model 
 
3.2 The variables and sample for the regression of the extracted surplus 
     As characteristics of a seller and buyer, that is, the control variables in the regression 
analysis of the extracted surplus, we use (i) regional dummies (US, Europe, Japan, others), (ii) 
type of business dummies (biotech, drug, others), (iii) public company dummy, and (iv) the 
number of previous alliances that a firm contracted. As explained in section 2, we also add year 
dummies as macro-economy factors. 
     Several factors influence the relative strengths and weakness in a firm’s bargaining 
position. One of the factors is a firm’s region, since differences in market conditions and 
technological levels among regions exist. Variations in the regional locations of sellers can be 
related to their bargaining power, since regional differences in stock markets may be large for 
young high-technology companies seeking financing. For example, Pagano et al. (2002) argue that 
US exchanges tend to be better suited to the needs of high-tech companies, based on statistical 
analysis of the cross-listing behavior of European and US firms from 1986–1997. In addition, a 
business type can place financial constraints on a firm. For example, a large pharmaceutical 
company may be less financially restricted, while a young biotechnology company may operate 
within strict economic limits. Similarly, the public or private status of a company is related to its 9 
 
accessibility to the financial market, which bears on its financial constraints. 
     Finally, we add the number of a firm’s previously contracted alliances to capture its 
experience with such agreements. It is well known that such familiarity is an important factor in 
the success of alliances, since it allows firms to master the management skills required in the 
latter (Kale et al. 2002). Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) report that biotechnology firms with 
such knowledge tend to develop more new products in alliances in comparison to firms without 
it. Thus, previous alliance experiences of a firm, especially seller, may affect its bargaining 
power in contracting an alliance. 
          From the estimation of the two-tier stochastic frontier model, we obtain 2,980 
observation-specific estimates of the extracted surplus for both sellers and buyers. However, not 
all of these alliances contain full data, many lacking information on either the seller or buyer. 
We use different sub-samples for the regression analysis of     | w E  and    | u E , the sample 
sizes of which are 1818 and 1792, respectively.
10  Tables 2 and 3 summarize the sample data for 
the explanatory variables for the regression of     | w E  and     | u E , compared to all the data 
containing each variable. 
 
Table 2 Summary of the sample data for OLS of     | w E  
Table 3 Summary of the sample data for OLS of     | u E  
 
4. Results 
4.1 The two-tier stochastic frontier model 
          Table 4 shows estimates of the two-tier stochastic frontier model (3). 
 
Table 4 Estimates of the two-tiered stochastic frontier model 
 
     Since  many  alliance  agreements  include  several technology and alliance types, we include 10 
 
all the technology, stage, and alliance type dummy variables, rather than the constant term. We 
also include the product of technology dummies and 2000 dummies (1 for alliances since the 
year 2000 and 0 for alliances before this) to capture changes in the value of technologies. For 
the maximum likelihood estimation of equation (3), the estimated coefficients of OLS with the 
same control variables are employed as the initial values for the coefficients of the controls. For 
the variance parameters, these are all set to one. 
     The results reveal that the development stages are the dominant factors in the 
determination of the contract price. The coefficients of the development dummies are all larger 
than those of the technology and alliance dummies. Moreover, later stages tend to be priced 
higher than earlier stages, which makes sense because the technologies of the former are closer 
to the market than those of the latter.   
          Although the effects of technology and alliance dummies are relatively small, differences 
exist among them. The estimated coefficients of the technology dummies are the technological 
differences of the 1990s. The estimated coefficients of the products of the technology and 2000 
dummies are the differences between the technology dummies’ coefficients of the 1990s and 
those of the 2000s. The results of the Wald test reject the null hypothesis that changes of the 
2000 technology dummies are all zero. Among the changes in technological differences, the 
increases in Monoclonals and Synthetics are remarkable. Among the alliance types, joint 
ventures tend to be priced higher than others, since the former include alliances concerning 
marketing. This conjecture is consistent with the finding that technologies in later stages tend to 
be priced higher. 
     The variance parameters of the error terms are all statistically significant, and the 
parameter  u   is more than two times larger than  w  . Since  u   and  w   are equal to the 
means of u and w, which follow exponential distributions, it can be implied that on average, 
buyers tended to have larger bargaining power than sellers did in biotechnology alliances. 
 11 
 
4.2 Regression of the extracted surplus 
          Tables 5 and 6 show estimates of the regression (OLS) of     | w E  and    | u E , the rate 
of increase, and the decrease in contract price (SIZE), respectively. In the following, we refer to 
  | w E  and    | u E  as the price increase and decrease effects. In both regression results, 
constant terms correspond to the coefficient of non-listed biotech firms in the US for the year 
1990. 
 
Table 5 Estimates of the regression (OLS) of     | w E  
Table 6 Estimates of the regression (OLS) of     | u E  
 
     After controlling seller/buyer characteristics, the estimated coefficients of the year 
dummies show that    | w E   has an increasing trend, while     | u E   has the opposite, although 
the increasing trend of sellers’ prices is moderate compared to the decreasing one of buyers 
(figure 2). It can be conjectured that the bargaining position of sellers may have been improving 
relative to that of buyers, which could explain the increasing trend in the average SIZE observed 
in Figure 1. A temporary gain in the bargaining power of buyers in the late 1990s may be related 
to the US biotech start-up boom, when the number of start-ups increased significantly because 
of advances in genomics, as well as the active venture financing in biotechnology (Motohashi, 
2010). The increased choice of technologies for pharmaceuticals may have contributed to the 
better bargaining position. In contrast, the number of new of biotech startups sharply dropped 
after the burst of the IT bubble in the early in this century, which led to a drop in buyers’ 
surpluses.    
 
Figure 2 Estimated coefficients for year dummies 
 
     For the differences in regions, sellers’ price increase effects are lower for Japanese and 12 
 
other regions’ companies than for their US counterparts, while the difference between the latter 
and European firms is almost zero and statistically insignificant. For buyers, the coefficients of 
the three regions are inferior to those of US companies. Among them, the coefficient of 
Japanese firms is the lowest and statistically significant. Regional differences may have existed 
not only in the bargaining power of sellers, as explained in section 3, but also in that of buyers. 
It may be harder for Japanese pharmaceuticals to negotiate with US biotech startups because of 
regional and cultural distances. This finding justifies a regional cluster policy for promoting 
technology providers (universities and biotech startups) and users (pharmaceutical firms) within 
proximity of each other. 
          As for company-type differences, drug firms as sellers have a higher price increase effect 
than biotechnology companies, which as buyers have a higher price decrease effect than the 
former. As shown in tables 2 and 3, biotechnology companies are mainly sellers in alliances. We 
assume that small numbers of successful biotechnology companies may have exerted a greater 
bargaining power as buyers relative to other firms of the same type than as sellers competing 
against pharmaceutical companies. On the other hand, since drug companies include many 
established large pharmaceutical corporations, they also exert significant bargaining power as 
sellers of biotechnologies. 
     As explained in section 3, we include a public company dummy because unlisted 
companies can face financial restrictions. However, the estimated parameters are statistically 
insignificant in both regressions, perhaps because the sample includes only a small number of 
unlisted companies. In the two sub-samples, there are only 153 alliances in which unlisted 
companies were sellers and only 75 in which they were buyers. If the unlisted companies in 
these alliances mostly consisted of large companies, such as subsidiaries of pharmaceutical 
firms, they may have been less financially restricted. 
          Finally, in terms of familiarity, sellers with greater experience have a higher price increase 
effect, which is consistent with the findings of the previous empirical research explained in 
section 3. On the other hand, for buyers in the same situation, the price decrease effect becomes 13 
 
smaller. The number of licensing contracts is correlated with firm size, and a deep pocket firm 
may make licensing deal with relatively generous conditions. In addition, a buyer’s tight 
interactions with one seller can generate sunk costs, which give rise to switching costs and 
lock-in problems (Arora et al., 2001). Thus, if buyers with longer experience mainly consisted 
of those who drew up repeated contracts with the same seller, longer experience would mean a 
higher sunk cost, which can make the coefficients for buyers negative, as a result of their 
reduced bargaining power. 
 
5. Conclusion 
     Because of the success of biotechnology, many new drugs for previously intractable 
diseases, such as cancer and HIV, are coming to the markets.
11 Not only patients but also 
investors are delighted to have such drugs, since they command large markets. For example, it is 
reported that the market for hepatitis C medications could reach four billion to five billion 
dollars by 2015.
12  For the health of both the human body and the economy, the division of labor 
between biotechnology and drug companies should be efficient. 
     In this paper, we investigated the distribution of bargaining power between sellers and 
buyers of biotechnologies, by estimating the extracted surplus by each party in alliance 
agreements, which depend on each party’s bargaining power. The findings show that the buyers 
have extracted large surplus from these transactions relative to the sellers. From these results, it 
can be conjectured that the negotiating force of pharmaceutical companies has been larger than 
that of their biotechnology counterparts. Therefore, government policies to decrease financial 
constraints on new biotechnology companies could contribute to an improvement in the 
efficiency of the biotechnology market. 
     On the other hand, the results reveal that after controlling various firms’ characteristics 
possibly related to their bargaining power, the extracted surplus by buyers has been decreasing 
while that of sellers has been increasing. These findings imply that the bargaining position of 14 
 
biotechnology companies relative to pharmaceutical ones has been improving since 1990. 
Moreover, the market for biotechnologies might have been growing more efficient, since the 
findings imply that contract prices were approaching the market values of biotechnologies. 
     A few factors may explain the increasing bargaining power of sellers. First, their success 
in developing biotech-based new drugs is attracting more investors and thus improving the 
financial conditions of biotechnology companies. Second, the trend of the pro-patent policy, 
which is often criticized for deterring innovation by causing the anti-commons problem, might 
have contributed to health care innovation by reducing the large bargaining power of 
pharmaceutical companies relative to their biotechnology counterparts. 
     We also have found a statistically significant difference in bargaining power of buyers 
across countries. It is relatively greater for US companies than for those of other regions, 
particularly Japanese firms. Since most of the sellers in our datasets are US biotech startup 
companies, this result confirms the importance of the regional proximity of sellers and buyers in 
the technology market. The relationship between technology spillover and regional proximity in 
biotechnology innovation has been extensively investigated (Zucker and Darby, 2001; 
Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). This study reconfirms these findings, specifically in the process 





Table 1: Technology types 
Integrated tech types Original tech types in RDNA






Rational Drug Design - Computational
Rational Drug Design - Synthetics
3 Recombinant DNA Recombinant DNA
4 Other biotechnology Carbohydrates




Oligonucleotides - Antisense/Triple helix








Monoclonals - Fully human Abs
Monoclonals - Human Abs
Monoclonals - Humanized & Fully Human Abs
Monoclonals - Humanized Abs
Monoclonals - Transgenic mice






Polyethylene glycol (PEG) products
Vaccines









Table 1: Technology types (continued) 
Integrated tech types Original tech types in RDNA
11 DDS Drug Delivery - Liposomes
Drug Delivery - Oral
Drug Delivery - Other
Drug Delivery - Sustained Release
































Table 2: Alliance types 
Integrated alliance types RDNA's original alliance types
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Table 1 Summary of the sample data for the estimation of two-tier stochastic frontier model 
Sample All data
Number of counts Percentage Number of counts Percentage
Technology Genetics 258 0.087 1934 0.119
Bioinformatics 118 0.040 1199 0.074
Recombinant DNA 209 0.070 889 0.055
Other biotechnology 387 0.130 2068 0.127
Monoclonals 274 0.092 1347 0.083
Drug related components 337 0.113 1785 0.110
In-licensed products 370 0.124 1117 0.069
Synthetics 954 0.320 2708 0.166
Screening 414 0.139 1847 0.113
Diagnotics 73 0.024 2461 0.151
DDS 524 0.176 1949 0.120
Others 256 0.086 2759 0.169
Number of records 2980 16299
Stage Discovery 842 0.283 4401 0.424
Lead Molecule 240 0.081 1013 0.097
Preclinical 308 0.103 874 0.084
Phase I 181 0.061 455 0.044
Phase II 284 0.095 593 0.057
Phase III 246 0.083 431 0.041
Approved 342 0.115 1096 0.105
BLA/NDA filed 79 0.027 186 0.018
Formulation 458 0.154 1341 0.129
Number of records 2980 10390
Alliance type Acquisition and merger 489 0.164 4113 0.193
Investment 939 0.315 2633 0.124
Joint venture 503 0.169 1374 0.065
Licenses 2513 0.843 12442 0.584
Unstructured collabolation 2242 0.752 12503 0.587












Table 2 Summary of the sample data for OLS of     | w E  
Sample All data
Number of counts Percentage Number of counts Percentage
Region US 1439 0.792 7207 0.711
Europe 219 0.120 1729 0.171
Japan 27 0.015 335 0.033
Others 133 0.073 861 0.085
Number of records 1818 1 10132 1
Type Biotech 304 0.167 9067 0.536
Drug 121 0.067 1451 0.086
Others 1393 0.766 6407 0.379
Number of records 1818 1 16925 1
Public Non-Public firms 153 0.084 1363 0.146
Public firms 1665 0.916 7951 0.854
Number of records 1818 1 9314 1  
 
 
Table 3 Summary of the sample data for OLS of     | u E  
Sample All data
Number of counts Percentage Number of counts Percentage
Region US 1184 0.661 8708 0.671
Europe 372 0.208 2536 0.195
Japan 163 0.091 810 0.062
Others 73 0.041 932 0.072
Number of records 1792 1 12986 1
Type Biotech 135 0.075 6462 0.346
Drug 523 0.292 4504 0.241
Others 1134 0.633 7734 0.414
Number of records 1792 1 18700 1
Public Non-Public firms 75 0.042 961 0.082
Public firms 1717 0.958 10731 0.918









Table 4 Estimates of the two-tiered stochastic frontier model 
Coefficient S.E.
Tech dummy Genetics 0.345 0.139
Bioinformatics -0.049 0.184
Recombinant DNA -0.212 0.142
Other biotechnology -0.234 0.115
Monoclonals -0.370 0.148
Drug related components -0.319 0.131






Tech dummy* Genetics -0.480 0.199
2000s dummy Bioinformatics 0.456 0.283
Recombinant DNA 0.798 0.211
Other biotechnology 0.507 0.163
Monoclonals 1.140 0.181
Drug related components 0.616 0.168






Stage dummy Discovery 1.894 0.170
Lead Molecule 2.146 0.180
Preclinical 2.318 0.170
Phase I 2.556 0.181
Phase II 2.618 0.173
Phase III 2.757 0.174
Approved 2.899 0.173
BLA/NDA filed 2.414 0.214
Formulation 2.039 0.190
Type dummy Acquisition or merger 0.551 0.097
Investment 0.449 0.063
Joint venture 0.873 0.076
License 0.506 0.097
Unstructured collaboration 0.676 0.074
Error component σv 0.977 0.080
parameter σu 1.204 0.063
σw 0.476 0.090
Tech-changes in 2000s Wald test statistics 305.040
p-value 0.000  
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Table 5 Estimates of the regression (OLS) of     | w E  
Coefficient S. E.
Constant 0.445 0.023


















Region Europe 0.002 0.017
Japan -0.059 0.028
Others -0.024 0.012
















Table 6 Estimates of the regression (OLS) of     | u E  
Coefficient S. E.
Constant 1.735 0.214


















Region Europe -0.100 0.059
Japan -0.296 0.063
Others -0.064 0.117
















































Figure 2 Estimated coefficients for year dummies 
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1  For a history of the development of the biotechnology industry, see Audretsch (2001).   
2  See Lerner et al. (2003), Figure 2 (page 418).   
3  See Ibid. for a survey of the theoretical literature on the relationship between external finance and 
a firm’s R&D performance. 
4 Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2009a) applied the framework to examine the relationship between 
wage dispersion in labor markets and bargaining power in each job match. 
5 This speciation of the two-tier stochastic frontier model is originally proposed by Polachek and 
Yoon (1987). 
6 The “two-step” estimation, where the stochastic frontier model is first estimated and then the 
estimated error component is regressed on exogenous variables, has been criticized in that the 
estimated parameters in the second step are biased (Wang and Schmidt, 2002). See the footnote 10 
for the reason that we employ the two-step approach despite the bias problem. 
7 http://www.rdna.com/ 
8  In the database, there are several alliance types that are not listed in the help file. Alliances of these 
unlisted types are also excluded from our dataset. 
9  For example, see Edwards et al. (2003). 
10 The sample size is reduced to 1,053 when the sample includes all the data for both the control 
variables of the two-tier stochastic frontier model and the exogenous variables related to the error 
components, which is a main reason that we employ the “two-step” estimation. As Wang and 
Schmidt (2002) show, it is always desirable to specify the stochastic frontier model so that both the 
control and exogenous variables are included and estimate it in “one-step.” The two-tier stochastic 
frontier model can be estimated in the one-step, as is done by Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2009b). By 
using their specification, we tried the one-step estimation with the reduced sample but did not obtain 
reliable results. 
11  See, for example, “Cancer Drugs: Therapy for Stocks?” by Barney Brodie, Businessweek, August 
25, 2005. 28 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
12 “Gilead Sciences: High-Performing Pharmaceutical Gilead Science,” by Aili McConnon, 
Businessweek, April 6, 2009. 